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I. INTRODUCTION
Silence is a problem whether it means something or nothing.
Whenever silence has meaning, or whenever an effort is made to
assign a meaning to it, there is an intrinsic difficulty: ambiguity.
Ambiguity results because silence does not define itself. Speech or
writing, on the other hand, has imposed a limit on itself by what has
been said or written. The observation has been made that speech has
unlimited content, whereas silence has singular content--one can say
anything but be silent in only "one way."' This comparison is not
helpful. The silence that pre-exists speech has unlimited potential.
* Professor of Law, Law Center, University of Houston.
1. Lawrence A. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 534 (1982). As I understand the
point, silence is "one way" because society's rules, especially the duty to speak, make its
meaning determinate. Notwithstanding the fact that there are instances where there is no
duty, deciding when and what duty shall apply is not self-evident. Furthermore, even
assuming the applicability of a duty, hard cases exist. For example, what if the silence is
because the "speaker" is a mute, or because she is so terrified she cannot speak, or because she
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After speech, a built-in limitation exists. The relevant comparison is
between speech and silence. Both are ambiguous, but the perceiver
can more easily fathom speech than silence. Both may be called sin-
gle events, but with silence, meanings range from nothing to anything.
Although a reader may find this paragraph ambiguous, it is closer to
saying something than a paragraph of blank space. But blank space
as a paragraph of nothing presents a problem as well because it allows
the reader to write the paragraph or fill the space. Perhaps silence is
never really silent.
The purpose of this essay is to identify, categorize, and evaluate
various congressional silences that appear before the United States
Supreme Court.
II. MISUSES OF SILENCE
A. Silence as Law
One could argue that whatever the array of meanings silence has
in the lay world, congressional silence has a special meaning. The
Constitution prescribes the method that must be followed for Con-
gress to enact laws. A failure to follow the method results in no law.
Congressional silence, by constitutional mandate, means nothing. If
prior law or thinking did not make this clear, the Chadha 2 case did.
If Congress is the source of authority or the source of the denial of
authority of, for example, certain action by the President, then it
seems beyond doubt that congressional silence does not suffice to pro-
vide or deny authority for action. Matters, however, are not so simple
in the Supreme Court. Two cases illustrate this complexity.
In the famous Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,3 President Truman seized the steel mills in order to
keep them operating during the Korean conflict. He could have
enjoined the ongoing strike by using the authority given him by Con-
gress in the recently passed Taft-Hartley Act.4 He chose not to go
that route because enjoining the workers and forcing them to continue
working for management would have been a serious anti-labor slap.'
The seizure seemed to be a perfect response. With the government in
control, the workers could return to their jobs, avoid working for
decides that although most persons would scream in the situation, the better and more
thoughtful response is silence?
2. Immigration & and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding
unconstitutional the "legislative veto" as a congressional management technique because it
does not follow constitutional procedures for law-making).
3. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1978).
5. President Truman earlier had vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act and tried to get it repealed.
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their management adversaries, and demonstrate their patriotism. The
difficult problem for the Supreme Court was to find a constitutional
power source for the President's action. No single express source
applied.6 The argument that the President had an aggregate power
derived from his specific authority as Commander in Chief and his
unspecific authority as Chief Executive was not sound. Then, as now,
the President had extensive power in foreign affairs, but neither coun-
sel nor the Court contended that the President's power in foreign
affairs would support the domestic application in question. The dis-
sent found support for the President in a litany of comparable actions
taken by several Presidents over the years.7 However, the majority
apparently was not convinced that a parade of illegal, questionable, or
unchallenged decisions would support the current action. Thus, the
President's seizure was either invalid or questionable under the Con-
stitution--depending on how one reads the concurring Justices'
opinions.'
Resolution of this question was unnecessary, however, because
the majority discovered an alternative argument they could more eas-
ily accept: Congress had spoken and had denied the President the
remedy he had attempted.9 But had it? If Congress not only had
provided a remedy for dealing with emergency labor problems, but
also had expressly forbidden all alternatives, then the Court's conclu-
sion would be beyond dispute (except for a separation of powers prob-
lem that has ripened in the last few years). In fact, Congress had not
expressly negated the range of power options that the President may
have had. Thus, to the extent the President possessed a constitution-
ally-based power source authorizing his action, Congress had not spo-
ken. The Supreme Court in Sawyer, as I read it, assumed presidential
power but then found a negative implication in congressional silence.
Several reasons suggest that this approach by the Court is
unwise. Practically, can the Court determine the significance of legis-
lative silence or inaction? The Supreme Court consistently and insis-
tently asserts that a denial of certiorari means nothing because
6. In the lower courts, the government argued that the President had an "unlimited
inherent" power. See the transcript quoted in ALAN F. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE 62 (1958). Later the government dropped the "unlimited"
power argument and emphasized "inherent emergency" power. See id. at 95-109.
7. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 683-700.
8. Justices Burton, Clark, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson all wrote concurring
opinions.
9. Justice Black's opinion for the Court is ambiguous regarding whether the holding is
that Congress denied the President the power or that in the absence of congressional
authorization the President lacked the power. Except for Justice Douglas, the concurring
opinions seem to stress the argument that Congress had taken away the President's power.
19921
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
practically it means nothing. So too with the legislative process.
There is no realistic way to identify the rationale behind individual
participants' failure to affirmatively act when they act in a group deci-
sion-making format. A second practical consideration concerns the
judicial role of interpreting legislative history. Any review of
Supreme Court decisions will reveal numerous cases in which the Jus-
tices disagreed about the meaning of what appeared on the surface to
be simple legislative language. Ambiguities in legislation obviously
abound. A search for clarity in legislative records often proves diffi-
cult and sometimes futile. Application of this process to what Con-
gress has not said in order to turn nothing into something that is
attributable to Congress would assure a result based on either error or
fiction.
Aside from the practical, there are two related constitutional
considerations. Building on Justice Stevens' rationale that was incor-
porated into law in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,"° any effort to find
law based on what Congress has not officially enacted into law seems
to violate the due process of lawmaking concept. " Similarly, as men-
tioned earlier, if Congress can make laws only by following the consti-
tutionally prescribed procedures, such that a legislative veto provision
in a valid law cannot stand because a legislative veto violates the pre-
sentment mandate of the Constitution, it follows that Congress cannot
make laws by inaction, for inaction obviously does not conform with
constitutional lawmaking requirements.
More recently, the Court has supplied a clearer picture of its
judicial technique for transforming congressional silence into law.'2
To free Iranian-held American hostages, President Carter, on behalf
of the United States, made an executive agreement with Iran. In
exchange for the release of American hostages held by Iran, the
United States promised, among other things, "to terminate all legal
proceedings in United States courts"' 3 brought by persons against
Iran. President Reagan subsequently issued an executive order to
carry out President Carter's agreement. Dames & Moore had a claim
pending in federal court against Iran and its atomic energy organiza-
tion for money owed on work done under a contract with the defend-
ants. The executive order had its intended effect and Dames & Moore
brought a separate action in federal court to challenge the constitu-
10. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
11. This idea is also discussed in Justice Stevens' dissent in Delaware Tribal Business
Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 96-98 (i977).
12. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
13. Id. at 665.
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tionality of the Presidents' actions. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 4 the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by then Justice
Rehnquist, upheld the Presidents' agreement and order. Although
the case is complex and the analysis fascinating for the way it man-
ages to sidestep several sensitive-issue pitfalls, the opinion clearly
reveals that the Court's validation of the suspension of Dames &
Moore's claim required it to find-which it did-that Congress par-
ticipated in the presidential decisions. Congressional silence enters
the picture here. After conceding that Congress had passed no law-
or other comparable measure-before the fact to authorize President
Carter's agreement, or after the fact to ratify his decision, the Court
nevertheless concluded that Congress, without ever complying with
constitutionally prescribed procedures for making official decisions,
had done something that transformed an executive act of trembling
constitutionality into a firm act the Justices could unanimously
accept. What did Congress do?
Although Congress had enacted two laws that related closely to
the subject-the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
the so-called "Hostage Act" -neither one, according to the Court,
authorized the President's action.' 5 Nevertheless, the statutes were
not "entirely irrelevant." 6 In fact they were "highly relevant,"' 7 the
Court said, "in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance
of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in this case."' 8 This reasoning is not easy to grasp. If the
Court had held one or both of the laws to be applicable by stretching
them through a process of either interpretation or construction, the
Court's reasoning would be understandable. If the Court, on the
other hand, had reached its result by finding that Congress had
entered the general field of international hostage-taking by passing the
two laws, that Congress knew how to legislate in the area, and that
the two laws did not authorize the President's action, the result would
still be understandable. After all, the usual interpretation maxim tells
us that what is expressed excludes all matter not expressed.
The Court explained that when Congress enacts authorizing leg-
islation "closely related"' 9 to a questioned presidential decision, Con-
gress "invite[s]" 2° the President to act as he did. The opinion also
14. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
15. Id. at 677-78.
16. Id. at 677.
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 678.
20. Id.
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supported the idea that a long term "acquiescence"'" by Congress
during an on-going presidential practice such as making executive
agreements with foreign nations to settle claims "authorize[s]" 22 a
President's decision that would have been initially subject to judicial
challenge. On this point, the Court quoted from Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case which stated that one can view
congressional acquiescence as a "gloss" '2 3 of validation and that acqui-
escence raises a "presumption"24 of congressional consent. 25
The Court's analysis leads to a strange consequence. Notwith-
standing that two Presidents and a unanimous Supreme Court pro-
vided the beginning and the ending to the contest with Iran, it was a
non-player, Congress, that got the discredit for the result. The result
is only a discredit because it is nothing short of an extortionate agree-
ment imposed on the United States by Iran and cloaked with the
Supreme Court's imprimatur of constitutionality based, supposedly,
on what Congress did. Poor Congress.
Alternatively, the Court could have followed Justice Jackson's
thinking as expressed in his dissent in the Korematsu 26 case. In Kore-
matsu, Justice Jackson conceded that the Commanding General of
the Western Command of the United States Army had made a valid
"military" 27 decision, based on an exigency, to exclude American citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast; but Jackson, never-
theless, believed that the decision violated the Constitution.28 Jackson
would have allowed the Supreme Court to refuse to hear the case and
let the military judgment stand on its own, but the Court could not
take the case and approve it under law and thus, clothe the decision in
constitutionality. In Dames & Moore, the Court could have recog-
nized that President Carter's decision to enter into the extortionate
agreement with Iran was a "political" decision based on exigency.
The decision was necessary to free the hostages. The Court could
then have recognized that Congress had not taken any constitution-
ally valid action in the matter-that it had not legally participated or
acquiesced in international extortion. Finally, as for the Court's role,
it could have refused to enforce the executive order derived from a
legally and constitutionally invalid executive agreement. As things
21. Id.
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).
25. Id. at 686.
26. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).




now stand, the same danger that Justice Jackson feared in Korematsu
lives on in Dames & Moore. To paraphrase his warning:
A [political] order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last
longer than the [political] emergency .... [Once] a judicial opinion
[,however,] rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution ... the Court for all time has validated the princi-
ple .... The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon.29
In effect, the Court supported extortion against the United States even
when it might disrupt domestic processes within the United States.
Perhaps, if the Court had not placed responsibility on Congress and
instead had accepted responsibility, Dames & Moore might have sent
a different message.
B. Silence as Policy
A series of cases concerning the recurring power battles between
states and Indian tribes illustrate the Supreme Court's variation on its
"silence as law" approach.
The Court, from the beginning, has had difficulty deciding when
a state may exercise jurisdiction-both judicial and legislative-over
Indian and even non-Indian affairs that occur on an Indian reserva-
tion located within a state. Traditionally, the Court precluded states
from interfering with Indian tribal governance by focusing on the
"sovereignty" of the tribes. In the early 1960s, in the Kake30 case,
Justice Frankfurter attempted to change the analysis from sovereignty
to pre-emption-unless Congress had pre-empted the states, they
could apply their laws to the reservation. The Court moved from a
pro-Indian stance to a pro-state stance in one easy case. However,
this posture did not last. In the 1970s-and continuing beyond-in
opinions written primarily by Justice Marshall, the Court fashioned a
multi-variable approach to resolving state-tribe disputes. For lack of
an official designation from the Court, I call it "policy pre-emption."
Policy pre-emption began in 1973 in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission.3 1 Justice Marshall, for a unanimous Court, wrote that a
state could not impose its personal income tax on a reservation Indian
who derived her entire income from sources on the reservation. The
Court's decision was not based solely and simply on the ground that
the Indian tribe was a separate sovereign nation. Instead, the Court
blended Indian sovereignty, which it called a "backdrop, ' 32 with fed-
29. Id. at 246.
30. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
31. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
32. Id. at 172.
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eral statutes and treaties; to this mixture it added the maxim that the
Court should construe doubtful law in favor of the Indians.3 3 The
Court developed this new recipe for pre-emption because the old one
had failed. The Court did discuss treaties and laws that skirted the
issues but were not directly on point. 34 The Court based pre-emption
on congressional "non-law." In lieu of law, the Court relied on con-
gressional policy. Once again, Congress received credit or blame for
actions that it had never taken when, in fact, the Court was responsi-
ble for both the creation of the policy and its implementation.
In 1983, in Rice v. Rehner,35 the Court modified its approach.
California had applied its licensing law to a liquor seller who sold
liquor on an Indian reservation, even though the seller was both a
tribal Indian and a federally licensed Indian trader. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, refused to apply policy pre-emp-
tion to the case by finding that the "backdrop" of Indian sovereignty
was missing 36-- that Congress had not only removed Indian authority
over liquor but had given it to the states. In other words, the Court
substituted legal pre-emption for policy pre-emption.37 The dissent
argued, however, that the majority's legal pre-emption approach was
impermissible "activism.1 38 Congress had not accomplished by law
what the majority claimed. Accepting the dissent's view, arguendo,
the majority pulled off a reverse policy pre-emption argument: con-
gressional policy, and not law, ousted the tribes, not the states, from
exercising sovereignty.
At the same time that Rice was muddying the waters, the Court
decided New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.39 Justice Marshall,
for a unanimous Court, reaffirmed policy pre-emption and precluded
a state from regulating hunting and fishing by non-members of an
Indian tribe on an Indian reservation.' The decision demonstrated
that although the doctrine of policy pre-emption had survived, the
Rice decision modified the doctrine. Instead of relying on a general,
broad-based, policy pre-emption, the Court had narrowed the focus;
the Court now relied upon the specific federal policy.4'
33. Id. at 174 (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
34. Id. at 174-80.
35. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
36. Id. at 724-25.
37. "The goal of any pre-emption inquiry is 'to determine the congressional plan'...." Id.
at 718 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956)). Nelson is a leading legal
pre-emption case.
38. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
40. Id. at 325.
41. Id. at 337-38.
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In 1989, the Court maintained this more specific policy pre-emp-
tion approach in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,42 although
this time with an unusual reverse result. The Court held that a state
could tax oil and gas production by non-Indians on an Indian reserva-
tion even where the tribe also taxed the same production. The Court
stated its philosophy:
[In considering pre-emption] .. .we have applied a flexible pre-
emption analysis sensitive to the particular facts and legislation
involved. Each case 'requires a particularized examination of the
relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.' . . . Moreover, in exam-
ining the pre-emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we
are cognizant of both the broad policies that underlie the legisla-
tion and the history of tribal independence in the field at issue.43
In a concluding paragraph, the Court disposed of two pre-emptions:
"We thus conclude that federal law.., does not pre-empt New Mex-
ico's oil and gas severance taxes .... Any impairment to the federal
policy.., is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cot-
ton's claim of pre-emption."" The Court in this case, as in earlier
ones, slips back and forth between legal and policy pre-emption, yet
policy pre-emption clearly remains a separate, independent ground of
analysis.
While the Court's search for, and use of, real congressional or
federal policy as the source of "law" is preferable to the Court's use of
"pretend policy," this approach still results in the Court's shifting
decisionmaking responsibility away from itself. Although wars, trea-
ties, and congressional laws have played roles in the United States'
efforts to govern American Indians, the Supreme Court has, from the
beginning, been a major participant in making decisions for their gov-
ernance. It is odd that the Court today hides behind phantom deci-
sions by others. In the absence of congressional law, the Court's
method of resolving state power in a state-tribe context could take the
same form as is used for state-state conflicts: the creation and appli-
cation of federal common law.
Two smaller misuse-of-silence issues need brief mention.
C. Subsequent Silence
When the Supreme Court decided in 1988 to reconsider the inter-
pretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that it had adopted in Runyon v.
42. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
43. Id. at 176 (citing Ranch Navajo Sch. Bd. Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N. M., 458 U.S.
832, 838 (1982)).
44. Id. at 186-87.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
McCrary,45 a "subsequent silence" problem moved to center stage.
"Subsequent silence" arises when, after the Court has interpreted or
construed a congressional law, the Congress is silent-there is neither
ratification of the Court's approach nor rejection of it. What is the
relevance of this "subsequent silence"? The issue provoked and
inspired commentators, but the Court majority seemed unmoved, and
disposed of it in a footnote.46 Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,47 stated "It does not follow,
however, that Congress' failure to overturn a statutory precedent is
reason for this Court to adhere to it."'48 In contrast, Justice Brennan,
writing for the three dissenters, argued that "[Congress'] failure to
enact legislation to overturn Runyon appears at least to some extent
indicative of a congressional belief that Runyon was correctly
decided. ' 49  This phrasing "appears at least to some extent" to be
"indicative" of the dissent's tepid "belief" in its argument. The
majority's position seems sound.
D. Chadha Silence
Assuming the Chadha5 o restriction on Congress, which prevents
either house alone or both together from playing an executive role by
monitoring enforcement of a law, is still valid today,51 the question
arises: how does the Chadha restriction apply to congressional
silence? Answer: the restriction applies with full vigor. If Congress
cannot override an administrative or executive decision by a joint or
concurrent resolution (without presidential involvement) or by sepa-
rate House vote, then the failure of Congress to act cannot be viewed
as having that effect.
III. THE USES OF SILENCE
Although congressional silence cannot, or should not, provide a
45. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
46. Id. at 168 n.8.
47. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
48. Id. at 175 n.l.
49. Id. at 200-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
50. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
51. The question is raised because when Chadha was decided in 1983, the Court was
pursuing a rigid structuralist approach to separation of powers, which meant that the Court
permitted very little power to cross over from one branch to another. Thus, the Court did not
permit a congressional effort to maintain management of executive or administrative functions.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), is a case similar to Chadha. With Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court, over
Justice Scalia's protests, seems to have switched to a more flexible, functional approach.
Arguably this new thinking will produce a reevaluation of Chadha.
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source of law or policy and cannot, or should not, provide a source of
subsequent ratification or a valid method of legislative monitoring,
congressional silence does not imply an absence of meaning. Silence
has several uses.
A. Silence as an Aid to Interpretation
Silence may serve as an important aid to understanding. If the
reader concedes that ambiguity exists in legislative law, that the
Supreme Court has a legitimate role to play in interpreting and clari-
fying the ambiguity,5 2 and that Court's use of language5 3 is an honest
effort to ascertain what Congress meant,54 then the question is raised:
what place does silence have? Let us assume an ambiguous group of
words (a phrase, sentence, paragraph, definition, or section) in a con-
gressional law. Other words used in the law, for example, either in
the same section of the law as the ambiguity, or in other sections of
the same law, or in other laws on the same or similar subjects, would
provide the obvious source for clarification.55 If this method proves
unsatisfactory, the temptation is great to seek reference outside con-
gressional law. But this presents a problem-actually, a twin prob-
lem. Anything not in the law or laws can be called silence, no matter
how loud it may sound. In other words, silence-perhaps it should be
called something like "official silence" 56 to distinguish it from its twin
"actual silence"-is simply part of the real world context out of
52. The premise of this essay rejects both original intent and textualism, although they are
currently popular with some judges and scholars. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415-24 (1989).
53. Thus, this essay also rejects deconstruction to the extent that it is taken to mean that
the reader (the Court) may take out of a text what it wishes while ignoring what the writer
(Congress) put in. Deconstruction, however, need not be viewed as nihilistic. See generally
J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
54. This is the traditional view, although it may be stated in varying ways. See HENRY M.
HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1411 (manuscript 1958) ("In interpreting a statute a court should: 1.
Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision
..; and then 2. Interpret the words of the statute... so as to carry out the purpose as best it
can."); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (1983) ("The concept of legislative intent is a hardy one and...
it is basic to maintaining an appropriately deferential judicial attitude."); Frank E. Horack, Jr.,
Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REV. 247, 249 (1947) ("[The
Court] is bound by the legislative declaration of policy and must interpret the statute as
Congress intended it to be interpreted.").
55. Looking beyond the immediate context of an ambiguity raises problems even if the
inquiry is kept within the confines of the same section of the law, or the same law, or a similar
law because the reference itself or its relation to the ambiguity may be ambiguous. This
problem is always present, however, whenever an analyst tries to clarify an ambiguous word by
referring to other words.
56. All words not part of a congressional law constitute official silence, so to speak.
1992]
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which Congress carved the law. All "official silence," however, does
not bear equal weight. Committee reports, house debates, early drafts
of the law, and proposals that Congress rejected, ignored, or modified,
all constitute types of "official silence" that, along with "actual
silence," constitute the context that may be useful to a court trying to
straighten the ripples of ambiguity. Actual silence, as part of official
silence, can mean at one extreme that during the legislative process no
one thought of the issue and thus no one spoke of it or at the other
extreme that Congress so obviously included the issue in the law that
no comment was called for. In both senses silence has meaning in the
interpretive process, but what it means will vary from case to case.57
In all instances, however, of using official silence and actual silence,
the Court aims to determine what Congress meant when it "spoke the
law" in question.5" In the interpretation context, silence, whether offi-
cial or actual, is no different than speech, whether official or unoffi-
cial-with one exception: those associated with the legislative process
who want to influence future interpretations will less likely manufac-
ture actual silence. 59
B. Silence and Duty
Occasionally Congress has a constitutional duty to speak. Rarely
will this congressional duty be expressed and at times it may be
viewed as a quasi-duty. In any event, if Congress is silent, the
Supreme Court may sense a gap that needs filling. For example, if
57. Commentators trying to provide order to "interpretive chaos" acknowledge that as
helpful as principles, approaches, and formulae may be, no simple solution can be applied to
all situations. As one analyst put it:
Although a fact-finding model of statutory interpretation [the approach
suggested by the analyst] provides no overarching theory for yielding predictable
results in all cases, it is doubtful that any theory could or, even if it could, that it
would be desirable to have all cases decided under some preexisting formula.
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1374 (1990).
58. I do not mean to suggest that the process is simple. Because words have no intrinsic
meaning but are mere symbols for real world referents, because words often have several
meanings, and because even where they have only one meaning, the scope of the meaning is
often accordion-like, a search for purpose becomes important. But purpose, too, is slippery. A
broad purpose or a narrow one? Whose purpose? The statute's, Congress', those who voted
for it, a majority of those who voted for it? I mention a few basic variables as a reminder of the
complexity of the interpretation task. It is not the purpose of this essay to try to identify a
proper theory or approach to interpretation. A court always should consider reductionism,
though, when it undertakes interpretation. See infra text at note 94.
59. For example, it is easy to imagine two congressional factions, unable to agree on a law,
passing a deliberately ambiguous statute in hopes that in the future courts would interpret the
ambiguity the "correct" way and then "assisting" the courts by padding the legislative history,
official silence, with comments regarding the law's meaning. A clever advocate could, perhaps,
accomplish the same thing by manipulating actual silence, but it would be more difficult.
[Vol. 47:375
CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE
Congress had not created federal trial courts and given them jurisdic-
tion to try matters that fell within the scope of Article III's judicial
power and if states had closed their courts to those same matters, the
Supreme Court probably would have filled this gap. The Court might
have established "temporary equity courts" to sit until Congress
acted. Similarly, suppose the federal government had a negative duty,
such as an obligation to refrain from violating certain constitutional
civil rights, and Congress had failed to legislate any remedies. The
Court probably would have created a remedy such as civil damages.
Bivens ° and its progeny are relevant.6 A third illustration arises
from the dormant Commerce Clause. In instances where Congress
has the power to regulate interstate commerce but chooses to remain
silent and states act instead, what should the Court do? Congres-
sional silence is not an official congressional pronouncement that the
states may freely regulate or that they cannot act. The Court has
filled this power void by allowing states some authority.62 In these
situations, the Constitution clearly allots power to Congress. The
Constitution, however, seems to speak to the Court, at least as far as
the Court hears that it should exercise an inherent "protective power"
while Congress dozes. Just as the President has an inherent power to
protect the country in extreme emergencies from armed attack in the
absence of a law giving the President such power, the Court has an
inherent power to protect the Constitution "from attack" in the
absence of a law from Congress.
C. Silence as Cover-up
In some instances, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Consti-
tution as outlawing congressional legislation that intends to achieve
unconstitutional results, such as "invidious racial discrimination" 63 or
aid to religion. 4 What happens when Congress enacts a law that pro-
duces one of these "suspicious" results but has on its face a neutral
purpose? The Supreme Court has held that a court may examine this
silence because it may be that (1) no legislators considered an imper-
missible purpose; (2) some considered the purpose, but silently
60. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
61. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
62. As long as a state does not discriminate against commerce, it may regulate a local
matter unless the regulation's impact on commerce is excessive when balanced against the
state's interest. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Even some discrimination
against commerce is allowed. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992).
63. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
64. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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adopted it; or (3) the legislators used this silence as a cover-up--a
massive conspiracy of silence. 65 Although judicial probing into the
meaning of silence in this context produces procedural and eviden-
tiary problems, the Court allows the probe.66
In the past, administrative and executive decisionmakers overtly
showed discriminatory intent because they thought they could get
away with purposes that are now forbidden. Today, society prohibits
such purposes; therefore, overt evidence is not usually available. The
danger is that the intent has gone underground. The nod, the wink,
the silence--communicate the same message. Moreover, this subtle
method of "intending" may operate at the legislative level. For exam-
ple, in Edwards v. Aguillard,67 the Court found that the stated secular
purpose, academic freedom, of a Louisiana statute that required
schools to teach "creation science" equally with the "theory of evolu-
tion" was a "sham. ' 68 The Court concluded that the silent "primary
purpose" was to endorse a particular religious doctrine in violation of
the Establishment Clause.69
IV. SILENCE AS NOTHING
When the Court confronts congressional silence that does not
help it interpret an ambiguity, trigger fulfillment of a duty, or prompt
inquiry into an impermissible congressional purpose, then the Court
faces a silence of nothing-a blank space. In such cases, the Court
may leave the matter alone or act to fill the void.
A. Construction/Reconstruction
At times, an issue of congressional silence that resembles but yet
differs from ambiguity faces the Court. To illustrate, in 1972 Con-
gress passed a law in response to an earlier failure of the government
to abide by a treaty made with several Indian tribes. In Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,70 a small tribe not listed as a
statutory beneficiary brought suit claiming entitlement to benefits
under the statute. Apparently, in preparing the bill, the congressional
staff simply erred in identifying the proper recipients. Before the
Supreme Court, the government conceded that the omission was inad-
65. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-68.
66. Id. at 268 ("In some extraordinary instances the members [of the legislature] might be
called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even
then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege.").
67. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
68. Id. at 586-87.
69. Id. at 593.
70. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
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vertent. This posed a problem for the Court because it could not
merely "interpret" the law to include the tribe. Could it reconstruct
the statute's coverage to include the grievants? The Court concluded
that Congress, not the Court, must make this type of corrective
surgery.7'
The line between interpretation and construction is difficult to
draw and maintain. 72 Courts often use construction in contract dis-
putes. When the parties litigate an omitted term, the question is
whether to supply a term and, if so, what term to supply. If both
parties want a missing term supplied but differ on its content, the
court, guided by equity, may provide relief without either upsetting
the litigants or transcending its authority. On the other hand, if the
parties dispute whether a term should be added, should the court side
with one party and fill the gap? The court may find that it should
supply a term because the alternative is to declare the contract unen-
forceable. The court may find it better to rework the agreement than
to void it. Similarly, in congressional legislation, when the court must
choose between declaring a law unconstitutional or adding a term, it
may be better to construct than to void the law. In Weeks, Justice
Stevens argued this position.73 Congress' inadvertent omission of the
small tribe violated the due process of lawmaking. Congress may
have a broad range of available valid options, but decisionmaking by
mistake is not one of them. Where the issue is not one of constitu-
tional dimension, but merely an obvious legislative error, the Court
should correct the error rather than enforce the law as written.
This discussion does not purport to resolve the dispute regarding
when, whether, or from whose perspective the Supreme Court should
engage in construction, but rather suggests that at times construction
is a sensible option. If the Court does construct terms to give congres-
sional law meaning or to keep it alive, it should acknowledge its crea-
tive judicial rule and not attribute its decision to Congress. It is
important to accurately identify the decisionmakers in the lawmaking
process. Moreover, if the Court admits its role in these decisions, the
Court will more likely construct with care.
B. The Common Law Solution
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Court decided that
71. Id. at 90.
72. Generally, courts ignore the distinction between interpretation and construction.
Nevertheless, these two principles address different issues.
73. 430 U.S. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
19921
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
federal common law provided a private contractor who did business
with the federal government an immunity from liability under a state
tort action.75 Although Congress had been silent on the issue-"con-
spicuously so" 76-the majority found that the imposition of a duty of
care on the contractor under state law presented a "significant conflict
with federal policy or interests. '77 Although the Court referred to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, it used federal common law as the source of
law for its decision. Clearly, as the dissent pointed out, "[t]his time
the injustice is of this Court's own making."'78  Whatever one may
think of the result in Boyle, at least the Court did not pretend that
Congress through its silence legislated the outcome. A commendable
forthrightness, however has its own problems. As the dissent stated,
the Boyle majority usurped the congressional legislative role.79 What
should the Court do when faced with a situation where state substan-
tive law clearly does not apply and Congress is silent? When, for
example, a state sues a state, or a tribe claims power as a sovereign,
should the Court simply deny the claim? Although the Court has
denied the existence of a "general" federal common law, it has used it
in specific instances.80
V. CREATED SILENCE AS NOTHING
The Supreme Court recently developed a three-part process of
analysis that creates ambiguity out of congressional clarity, classifies
the ambiguity as a silence that means nothing, and then gives meaning
to the nothing by reference to a policy presumption of its own mak-
ing. Gregory v. Ashcroft"' is the case in point. The issue concerned
whether a mandatory retirement provision for state judges in the Mis-
souri Constitution violated the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"). The law contained exceptions from its
coverage for certain high-ranking government officials, but the exclu-
75. Id. at 511. The majority's opinion is narrow.
But we have held that a few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests'.. . are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control
that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a
content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called
'federal common law.'
Id. at 504 (citations omitted). Actually, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
to clarify an ambiguity in its opinion. Id. at 514.
76. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 509, 511.
78. Id. at 516.
79. Id.
80. See the discussion in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 6.1-6.3
(1989).
81. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
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sions did not clearly apply to state judges appointed by a governor.
The language in the statute that most closely applied to the judges
referred to "an appointee on the policy-making level."'8 2  The
Supreme Court majority conceded that that language "is an odd way
for Congress to exclude judges."83 One might think that if the excep-
tion did not include the judges, then the Act covered the judges and
thus protected them from discharge because of age. However, the
Court said, "we are not looking for a plain statement that judges, are
excluded. We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless
Congress has made it clear that judges are included." 4 The Court
concluded, "[i]t is at least ambiguous whether a state judge is an
'appointee on the policy-making level.' "85 The Court, however, did
not then try to resolve the ambiguity using the usual means, such as
legislative history. As the dissent pointed out, the legislative record
proved that the statute did not exclude the judges from coverage.86
Thus, the majority's reasoning created ambiguity from clarity and
silence from ambiguity, and redefined the silence with a policy of its
own creation: "federalism." As a result, the Court avoided "a poten-
tial constitutional problem"87 that would arise if Congress' exercise of
the commerce power interfered with the "authority of the people of
the States to determine the qualifications of their government offi-
cials."88 In effect, the Court, while expressly acknowledging the limi-
tations on its power to declare unconstitutional Congress' exercise of
its commerce power established in Garcia,s9 resurrected Usery9 °
without citing it as a basis for limiting Congress through "interpreta-
tion," resulting in a remarkable deconstruction and reconstruction.
VI. STATUTORY SILENCE
To what extent may Congress, through its legislation, make
affirmative use of its silence? Where Congress' actions do not violate
82. Id. at 2403.
83. Id. at 2404.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2416.
87. Id. at 2403.
88. Id.
89. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding
constitutional the application of minimum-wage and overtime requirements of Fair Labor
Standards Act to public mass-transit authority).
90. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding the 1974 amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which extended minimum-wage and maximum-hours
provisions to employees of states and their political subdivisions, exceeded congressional power
under the Commerce Clause).
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Chadha, affirmative use of silence by Congress would not seem to
present a problem. But, in such instances, Congress is, in one impor-
tant sense, not silent at all.
A. Conditions
Congress obviously may condition the operational effect of its
laws. It may indicate what events shall mean. For example, Congress
may condition money grants on the occurrence of certain events, such
as approval by the state legislature or the economy falling to a certain
level as determined by statistical facts. Similarly, the non-occurrence
of an event may serve as a condition. It simply does not matter
whether Congress phrases the condition in terms of an act or a non-
act.
B. Interpretation
Congress may also address the meaning of its silence in other
ways. It may expressly indicate how courts should interpret its
silence. For example, in the McCarran Act,91 Congress instructed the
courts that, "silence on the part of the Congress shall not be con-
strued to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the
insurance] business by the several States."92 Because the Act also
contained affirmative authority for the states to apply their laws, the
Court upheld the law without discussing the consequence of the
silence provision alone.93
C. Delegation
Where Congress delegates authority to administrative agencies,
executive officials or the courts, it forgoes, by definition, its power to
speak to the substantive issues; Congress' silence allows others to
speak in its stead. At least two related reasons explain the use of such
silence by Congress. First, it increases the wisdom of resulting laws
by delegating authority to administrative agencies or executive offi-
cials to make rules during the life span of a complex, regulatory law.
Such an approach recognizes that Congress is not prescient and can-
not always determine the best law in one sitting. In addition, such
congressional silence enhances the accuracy and fairness of the law in
individual instances by delegating authority to the courts to provide a
needed specificity. Making law and applying law are two altogether
different processes. Treating them alike runs the risk of "reduction-
91. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-15 (West 1976).
92. § 1011.
93. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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ism."9 4 A legislature cannot or should not decide what the full range
of fact patterns will be that will fall within the law's coverage.
Administrative rule-making adds dimensions of scope and depth
to congressional law; and judicial lawmaking, through interpretation
and construction, custom fits the law to make it apply to cases. Criti-
cisms of these practices, perhaps, would be softened by the realization
that such delegations are often creative uses of silence by Congress in
order to make more meaningful the legislative process. According to
a "structuralist" philosophy of constitutional separation of powers,
intentional delegations of power to the executive or the judicial
branch from the legislative branch may be improper. Under the cur-
rent "functional" approach, any purposeful enlisting of help by Con-
gress from the other branches should usually be acceptable.
Of course, Congress does not intend all silence. Where Congress
inadvertently remains silent, for example, different considerations
apply. Intentional silences will vary.95 Sometimes the law will be
elaborate, allowing only a small amount of silence for an agency or
court to modify into words. Other times, the silence may be deafen-
ing. If the silence is too "standardless" for agencies or too "vague"
for courts, constitutional due process may be violated.
VII. CONCLUSION
However difficult it may be to understand words, it is far more
challenging to make good sense out of silence. When a speaker lines
words up into a purported communication, the arrangement of the
words serves, to some degree, to identify both a communication and
to whom the speaker directs the words; the arrangement also identi-
fies the content; and where that content remains ambiguous, it helps
to clarify the message. Silence, on the other hand, does none of these
things. The perceiver must construct the silence.
94. One aspect of the reductionist fallacy is the use of reasons that support general
conclusions to resolve particular ones. For example, the reasons why people support freedom
of choice for pregnant women does not explain why in any given instance a person will send a
contribution to a national organization supporting the same cause. To go from sociological
explanations to psychological ones requires a different analysis. So, too, the legislative process
of problem-solving and the judicial process of problem-solving--even when both are speaking
to the same law-are not the same. The judicial variables are more fact specific. They include,
even aside from constitutional restrictions, what might be called legislative fairness, equality,
common sense and the like.
95. An intriguing case containing "double silence" is McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct
1081 (1992). Because Congress was silent in its delegation to the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
and the Bureau in turn was silent concerning the "exhaustion" requirement, the Supreme
Court balanced considerations in deciding that exhaustion is not required in a money damages
claim brought under the authority of Bivens.
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The Supreme Court, as ultimate perceiver of congressional
silence, decides whether Congress has said anything through its
silence, and if so, what. The silence situation is obviously opaque.
The risks of error and manipulation remain ever present. This essay
has tried to identify and evaluate the use of several categories of
silence.
The Supreme Court in Sawyer and Dames & Moore perceived
congressional law in congressional silence. In a litany of cases dealing
with state power over Indian reservations, the Court discovered con-
gressional policy in silence. This perception results in faulty process
or poor substantive law or both, molded by the United States
Supreme Court into a precedent for other courts to emulate-not only
for procedural and substantive law, but for methodology in reading
legislative silence. Institutionally, neither the Court nor Congress
gains from this type of decisionmaking. Such decisionmaking makes
the Court look manipulative and the Congress impotent. A similar
criticism applies to the Court's decision to create silence out of a con-
gressional meaning and then to recreate a meaning of its own making.
Understandably, the Court hesitates on sensitive issues. Several
court-created prudential doctrines, such as political question, stand-
ing, and ripeness, give the Court avenues of avoidance. When the
Court takes a case, however, it should be, as this essay suggests, rea-
sonably open and clear in its approach to the decision. Ironically,
issues that fall within the prudential limitations or that the Court
resolves on the merits through one of its techniques of obfuscation or
casuistry, most need a sensible solution. Of course, the Court
embraces the vision that it should decide no constitutional question
before its time. The wisdom of this policy, although not self-evident,
does not apply when the time has come. Thus, when a legitimate
issue arises concerning, for example, the scope of presidential power
or the power of states over Indian territory and Congress has been
silent, if the Court takes the case, why does it not resolve the issues by
reference to its own thinking and reasoning? Where issues have con-
stitutional dimension, the Court need not resort to congressional law
or policy. In related areas of silence as well, the Court functions, or
could function, solo. Recall the categories discussed in this essay.
Where a gap exists in a law, the Court may fill it through judicial
construction. In some instances, where Congress has been silent, the
Court may fall back on a specific federal common law. Where con-
gressional silences fails to meet a duty (or quasi-duty), the Court may
provide a temporary solution.
In other situations, the Court may find congressional silence has
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meaning. When interpreting, the Court may consider silence along
with other relevant matters to ascertain what Congress did when it
spoke. In other instances, the Court may consider silence as it
searches for any impermissible congressional purpose. Further, the
Court may understand silence as a purposeful delegation of authority
to agencies or courts.
Silence is difficult to categorize. The Supreme Court and others
should try to identify and cabin silence-to control it-so that they
may use it accurately and meaningfully and avoid misuse and
manipulation.
A final metaphor as this essay reaches its own silence: Congres-
sional silence may not be an art form-it is certainly not "that perfect
moment"9 6 at the end of great music, or a wag might add, at the end
of certain legal writing-but it is a delicate instrument which courts
and, especially, the Court, should play with care.
96. Scorr TUROW, THE BURDEN OF PROOF 550 (paper edition 1990).
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